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CRIMINAL TRIALS-PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED.
The growing tendency of some of our courts to dispense with at
least a few of the many rigid rules of criminal procedure is illus-
trated by the case of Stoddard v. State, 112 N. W. (Wis.) 453. In
that case the court held that, though it was a felony case, it was not
error to receive the verdict while the accused was out on bail. Thus
the case stands for authority that the accused on trial for felony may
waive his right to be present at the rendition of the verdict.
The general rule throughout the entire laws of criminal proced-
ure is that after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the cause
in the absence of the prisoner. Bishop on Crim. Proced., Vol. I.,
Sec. 265. But this principle has been modified somewhat by the doc-
trine of waiver. It is as to the extent to which the waiver may be
carried that the courts fail to agree. Nearly all of our courts allow
one indicted for misdemeanor to waive the right of presence during
trial. United States v. Mayo, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 754; Warren v.
State, 19 Ark. 214. But when the case is for felony, most of our
courts have adopted from the English decisions the rigid rule that
the right to be present during the whole trial is absolute and inalien-
able. Prime v. Commonwealth, 6 Harris (Pa.) io3; Andrew v.
State, 34 Tenn. (2 Sneed) 550; Sneed v. State, 5 Ark. 431.
The reason for the strength of this inflexible rule evidently came
from the abuse of secret examinations, so common in the reign of the
Stuarts. But as mermory of such high-minded methods grew dim
and our judges saw the administration of justice hindered in individ-
ual cases by the invoking of technical defenses, we find this doctrine
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of waiver growing in strength. The principle seems first to have
been applied in cases where the prisoner was voluntarily absent for
a few moments during the admission of testimony. That this should
be ground for a new trial seemed absurd on its face. The dictates
of common sense overcame the abstract rules. In this same way we
find the courts in a considerable number of our states extending the
idea to cases where accused has oportunity to be present at the rendi-
tion of the verdict, but absents himself of his own free will. Fight
v. State, 7 Ohio (Ham.) Rep. Part I, p. I81; Wilson v. State, 2 Ohio
State 319; McCorkle v. State, 14 Ind. 39; Schlinger v. People, io2
Ill. 245; Hill v. State, 17 Wis. 675. The two earliest of these cases,
Fight v. State and Wilson v. State, on which the others more or less
rely, were decided on the ground that the rule requiring the presence
of the prisoner during every part of the trial, was one purely for the
prisoner's own benefit and hence, a right which he could waive. If
he can waive the right to trial altogether by pleading guilty, why can
he not voluntarily be absent from some part of the proceedings?
Where he is out on bail, some of the courts say that it is his duty
to return to receive the verdict. Is it not absurd, then, that he
should be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong and breach
of duty, and thus defeat the ends of justice?
But the courts in the majority of our states refuse to follow this
reasoning and repudiate the idea that a prisoner may waive the right
of presence at the rendering of the verdict. Prime v. Common-
wealth, Supra; Andrew v. State, Supra. These courts look
beyond the individual prisoner in the individual case and
consider the. required presence of the accused as one of the
bulwarks against the possibility of irregular court proceedings.
It is on this ground that the judges, who oppose the encroachments
of this doctrine of waiver on the stricter criminal procedure, stand.
Chief Justice Smith, dissenting in State v. Kelly, 97 N. C. 409, stated
the idea very clearly, when he said: "I am not disposed to relax those
safeguards which the wisdom of past ages has provided for the
security of persons charged with crime, while the modern tendency
is manifested in some of the courts to dispense with them, upon the
idea of waiver, because of the inconvenient necessity for a new trial,
which an observance of them may render necessary . ..
Now, it is true, the conduct of the accused in his hasty departure,
when the jury were about to deliver their verdict, the purport of
which he seems to have anticipated, entitles him to no favor, but it is
the importance and value of the principle which is sacrificed in giv-
ing effect to a verdict thus rendered."
But the judges favoring a more liberal criminal procedure claim
that this principle, which is so strongly clung to by many of our
courts, is one for which there is no longer any necessity. The pub-
licity of our modern life takes away the need of protecting the pris-
oner by means of numerous technicalities. So we see this doctrine
of waiver growing in many of our states along with the movement
toward a less frequent granting of new trials because of some slight
technicality. The idea looks towards the leaving of more of the
minor details of trial within the discretion of the trial judge. He is
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in a position to know the ins and outs of the whole case and should
be best fitted to determine the minor matters of procedure as they
arise.
Of course there are disadvantages attending any loosening of
our procedure. But despatch is an essential of justice just as is
stability. It is a significant sign when public sentiment favors doing
away with many of the technical protections thrown about the
accused, and feels safe in looking for substantial justice at the hands
of our judges. The allowing of a prisoner to waive, by mere volun-
tary absence or otherwise, his right to be present at the rendition of
the verdict seems in line with this general trend of sentiment.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-REBATES UNDER THE EILKIN'S LAW OF 1903.
Interstate commerce as coming within the purview of the consti-
tutional provision that "Congress shall have power . . . to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states
and with the Indian tribes," has been the subject of various litiga-
tions, and perhaps equally as varied dicta by the courts. The judi-
cial construction of this clause begins in 1824 with the case of Gib-
bons v. Ogden, wherein Chief Justice Marshall declared that the
power to regulate, being the power to prescribe rules by which com-
merce is to be governed, is complete as vested in Congress and
acknowledges no limitations other than as prescribed in the consti-
tution. The line of demarcation between interstate and intra-state
commerce being under the control of the individual state, was laid
down by the "original package" rule, first stated in 1827 in the case
of "Brown v. Maryland. This line of difference involving the power
of the state to legislate upon interstate commerce; in the absence of
any regulation by Congress, not being decided, remained a vexata
quaestio until 185r, when the jurisdiction of the state courts was
confined to those questions of local interest included under police
regulations, and that, too, only in the absence of any regulations by
Congress. This view was not universally adopted. The Granger
cases held state regulations of interstate rates valid in case of the
absence of legislation by Congress. But in 1886 the Supreme
Court of United States reversed the Supreme Court of Illinois in
Wabash R. Co. v. Ill., 118 U. S. 557, denying to the states the power
to any such regulations whatever. In the same year the Tennessee
drummer case denied the power of the state to impose any tax what-
ever upon interstate commerce. It was then in the absence of stat-
utory regulations whatever, except the Act of 1866, Revised Stat-
utes, Section 5258, authorizing the formation of continuous lines
and through shipments by agreements, that the Interstate Commerce
Act was passed on Feb. 4, 1887.
The wide diversity of opinions during the debates in Congress,
giving rise to the caustic characterization of the act as one which
'nobody understands, nobody wants, and everybody is going to vote
for," was fully warranted by subsequent judicial interpretation of its
provisions, especially as to what were the "substantially similar
circumstances and conditions" of the fourth section. Subsequent
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amendments have at least proved that it did not meet the demands
of the situation, among which was the Elkin's Act of 19o3, pro-
viding that, "Every person or corporation who shall offer, grant or
give, or solicit, accept or receive any such rebates, concessions or
discriminations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than one
thousand dollars nor more than twenty thousand dollars."
This Act was brought before the courts in the case of Unit-ed
States v. The Standard Oil Co. of Ind., 155 Fed. 305, upon an indict-
ment on 1903 counts, each charging the movement of one car, of oil
as an interstate shipment. The constitutionality of the Act was
sustained against the contention of the defendant to the effect that:
(i) the natural and inherent right to make a private contract was
involved, (2) authorizing common carriers to fix such rates as when
published shall become binding, is a delegation of legislative power,
(3) judicial power vests in the commission in that it is to pass upon
the ultimate reasonableness or unreasonableness of the rate charged,
(4) the "commerce clause" of the constitution does not empower
Congress to forbid and make criminal the act of defendant in accept-
ing a rate less than that fixed and filed as required by the Act. The
first contentions of defendant above was denied on the ground of the
public character of railroads as declared by frequent holdings of the
courts. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Brown, 123 Fed. 946; Common-
wealth v. Interstate Consol. St. Ry. Co., (Mass.), 73 N. E. 530.
The Supreme Court of United States has frequently ruled adversely
to contention (2) of defendant. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Dey,
35 Fed. 866. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307. The
courts have ruled against (3) above, in that common law remedies
are not barred by the statute. Gen. Sts. I9OI, section 5998. Mo.
Pac. R. Co. v. State, 77 P- (Kan.) 286. Contention (4) of defend-
ant is denied and the receiving of rebates thereby ngade a criminal
offense on the ground that Congress, having the right to establish
uniformity in rates, may adopt whatever remedial measures may be
necessary to enforce them. Congress has primary power to protect
interstate commerce. Charge to. Grand Jury, 2 Sprague (U. S.)
279.
The question of rebates, though perhaps for the first time the
subject of legislation in the Interstate Commerce Act, is by no means
a new one to the American courts. The more general term, dis-
crimination, as involving rebates, has for a long time been the sub-
ject of litigation. There are dicta in the English cases and many
cases may be found to sustain this view, that at common law, com-
mon carriers were bound to make reasonable, but not equal charges,
and that one of whom a fair compensation was exacted had no
cause of complaint because another obtained a similar service for
less. Branley v. Southeastern R. Co., 12 C. B. (N. S.) 63, 75;
Oxlade v. N. E. Ry. Co., 40 Law & Eq. 234. So it has been usual
in English railroad charters to insert clauses expressly requiring
reasonable facilities to be afforded to all on equal terms and enacting
special remedies for. unjust discriminations. McDufee v. Portland
& Rochester R., 52 N. H. 43o. So the "equality clause" in 8 and 9
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Vict. .c 20, section 9, that tolls shall be charged equally to all persons
and after the same rate in respect to all goods of the same descrip-
tion passing over the same portion of the same line under the same
circumstances supplements whatever defect there may have been in
the common law in the prohibition of unreasonable discriminations.
The most recent decisions which have passed upon the obliga-
tions of railway companies to the public have been almost uniform
in following the principles of the common law, not only prohibiting
discriminations, but requiring the strictest impartiality in the con-
duct of their business, as declared by Supreme Court of U. S. in
i9oi, in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., I8I U. S. 92;
Pierce on Law of Railroads, p. 498. Since, upon the question of
discrimination, this Act is in the main only an enumeration of the
common law provisions, its purpose was the prevention of a specific
violation of the imposition of specific penalties. We find then that
Judge Tandis follows the real spirit of the Act in exercising the
discretion entrusted to the judiciary by imposing a fine of $29,240,-
ooo upon the defendant. This discretion is not a power which may
or may not be exercised acording to the peculiar inclination of the
particular occupant of the bench, but is a part of the duty of the
judge as a trial court. Goodwin v. State, 51 S. E. (Ga.) 598.
IS THE ACTION BY A DEPOSITOR AGAINST A BANK FOR WRONGFUL
REFUSAL TO HONOR A CHECK, EX CONTRACTU OR EX DELICTO.
While all courts are agreed that when a bank has sufficient funds
of a depositor in its possession to honor the depositor's checks drawn
on it, and such funds are not subject to any lien or claim, the bank
is liable to an action by the depositor for its neglect or refusal to
honor his checks, Wiley v. Bunker Hil National Bank, 183 Mass.
495, yet they are far from being in harmony as to whether the action
is one ex contractu or one ex delicto.
In the recent case of Lorick v. Palmetto National Bank of Colum-
bia, 57 S. E. (S. C.) 527, the plaintiff brought action against the
defendant Bank for damages for wrongfully refusing to honor the
plaintiff's check. Pending the suit the plaintiff died, and the suit
was continued in her behalf by her administrator. The question
arose whether the action was one ex contractu and survived to the
administrator, or whether it was one ex delicto and did not. The
court held that, although the plaintiff had attempted to bring her
action in tort and had failed, yet she should not be deprived of her
relief on account of the technicality, and as she had stated facts suffi-
cient to constitute a cause of action ex contractu she was entitled to
pursue her relief in that form of an action, and such right of action
survived to her administrator.
Some decisions are based upon the nature of the wrong done;
that is, the breach of contract, or the tort. Others are based upon
the extent of the injury; that is, the measure of damages in either
case. There are three different opinions as to the nature of such an
action. Some courts hold that it is strictly an action e.x contractu.
This view obtains in California, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts
and Nebraska. Others hold that the action is one essentially ex
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delicto.. This is the rule in Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Pennsyl-
vania and Tennessee. The third view is that an action lies either
in contract or tort, which obtains in New York, and, by the recent
case, in South Carolina.
The English courts have a rather peculiar theory of such an
action, as is shown in the pioneer English case on the subject, Mar-
zetti v. Williams, i Barnewall & Adolphus Reports, 415. The court
in this case held that, although it is immaterial whether the action
be in form, in contract or in tort, yet it is substantially founded on
the implied contract between the bank and the depositor. Dam-
ages were allowed as for breach of contract. The court was aware,
too, of the injury to the depositor's credit. This decision has been
followed by the English courts except in the case of Rolin v. Stew-
ard, 18 Jur. Pt. I, p. 536, where the court said the action was one in
tort.
These cases are based on the theory that when a person deposits
money in a bank he thereby immediately assumes a relation with the
bank which is fixed and determined by law. This relation is that of
debtor and creditor, and that only. If the depositor has sufficient
funds in the bank, which are not subject to any liens or claims, the
law implies a contract on the part of the bank to pay out these funds
upon the depositor's orders and according to his directions. When
the depositor has sufficient funds in the bank to meet the check and
the bank, without authority, wrongfully refuses or neglects to honor
the same, a right of action immediately accrues to the depositor for
the breach of the implied contract. The bank is liable to the extent
and for the same reason that other persons are liable for the non-
performance of their contracts. As to the measure of damages the
courts have generally adopted the rule set forth in the case of Hadley
v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 353, and awarded compensation for such dam-
ages which may fairly and reasonably be considered as naturally
arising from the breach of the contract according to the usual course
of things. Wiley v. Bunker Hill National Bank, supra; Kleopfer
v. First National Bank, 65 Kans. 774.
The decisions that such an action is properly one ex delicto are
the result of an entirely different line of reasoning. The great nat-
ural right which every government recognizes and protects is that
of personal security, by which one is entitled to complete immunity
from attack and injury. Thus is one's reputation made secure, and
he who deservedly stands in good repute has the right to, and it is
the duty of all others, which may be enforced in all jurisdictions,
to abstain from interfering with the uninterrupted enjoyment of a
good reputation. When a bank wrongfully refuses or neglects to
honor a depositor's check, it thereby charges him with insolvency,
dishonesty, or bad faith, and not only injures his reputation, but also
impairs his credit. There is something more than a mere breach
of the contract implied by law between the parties. To impute
insolvency to a trader is a most effectual way of slandering him and
is -actionable, and he can recover general damages therefore.
Schaffner v. Ehrman, 139 Ill. io9; Svendsen v. State Bank of
Duluth, 64 Minn. 40; 1. M. James Company v. Continental National
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Bank, 1O5 Tenn. i. And it is immaterial whether the depositor
is a natural person or corporation. Metropolitan Supply Company
v. Garden City Banking Company, 114 Ill. App. 318.
It is objected by some courts that as a corporation cannot speak
except through its agents, it cannot be guilty of slander, the agents
themselves being personally liable in such cases. Eichner v. Bowery
Bank, 24 App. Div. 63 (overruled). But such courts fail to see the
analogy between oral slander and slander by act or deed. The
latter is just as effective as the former in accomplishing the same
ends. I. M. James Company v. Continental National Bank, supra.
It'is also objected in a great many cases that the refusal is not mali-
cious, and as malice is the gist of slander, there is no slander.
Though the wrong is unintentional, the refusal to pay was inten-
tional and without just excuse, and legal malice will be presumed.
Schaffner v. Ehrman, supra; Metropolitan Supply Company v. Gar-
den City Banking Company, supra.
There is another ground upon which the decision that such an
action is properly one ex delicto, is based. It is the broad ground
of public policy. A bank is a quasi-public corporation whose duty
imposed by the government by charter, is to safely hold all moneys
deposited therewith. Banking facilities are absolutely essential to
business, and banks would have the public at their mercy were the
damages for their wrongful refusal to honor a check limited to those
resulting from a mere breach of contract. A rule of this kind might
hinder commerce. First National Bank of Lock Haven v. Mason,
95 Pa. St. 113; Patterson v. Marine National Bank, 13o Pa. St. 419.
New York allows the action to be brought either ex contractu
or ex delicto, for the same reasons that other states permit the one or
the other to be brought. The earlier New York courts favored
solely an action ex contractu. Brooke v. Tradesmen's National
Bank, 23 N. Y. Supp. 802; Eichner v. Bowery Bank, supra.
But the present doctrine is recognized in the cases of Borroughs
v. Tradesmen's National Bank, 33 N. Y. Supp. 864; Davis v. Stand-
ard National Bank, 5o App. Div. 210; Clark Company v. Mount
Morris Bank, 85 App. Div. 362; Citizen's National Bank v. Import-
ers' & Traders' National Bank, 119 N. Y. 195.
Although, previous to the recent South Carolina decision, New
York was the only state in which such a rule obtained, still it seems
the most equitable and just rule. The wrongful refusal of a bank to
honor a depositor's check involves not only the right arising from
the contract implied by law between the parties, but also the natural
right to security in his reputation. Such an act by the bank is a
violation of both rights at one and the same time. The depositor is
wronged, and is entitled to his remedy regardless of the form of the
action by which he seeks to obtain it, and he should not be deprived
of his remedy for having brought his action in one form if he has
stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in the other
form. The New York rule not only satisfies the requirements of
good pleading, but it also does that which is of far greater impor-
tance, in that it removes the technicalities of pleading and makes
the redress to the depositor for the violation of his right, to which
he is so justly entitled, most certain and secure.
COMMENTS
REPRESENTATIONS ANP WARRANTIES.
In a recent case, Morley v. Consolidated Mfg. Co., 8i N. E. 63,
the Massachusetts court has applied the rule of caveat emptor more
strictly than hitherto. In making this ruling, the court has departed
from certain authorities which have had occasion to deal with the
exact words and phrases, used by the salesman in the case consid-
ered. In this case, the plaintiff purchased a machine, paying there-
for about half the price of a new one of the same make, fully under-
standing that it had been used as a demonstrating car, but the sales-
man had said that "it was in first-class condition, and all right."
The machine was used by the plaintiff about two months when the
crank-shaft broke and materially damaged the engine. He endeav-
ored to recover back the purchase price, relying on the assertions
of the salesman, but the Supreme Court denied his right to do so,
stating that "There was no express warranty. All that was said
as to the value and nature of the machine was mere seller's talk."
Further than that, the court denied that there' was any implied war-
ranty.
If the decision is correct in that the words do not amount to a
warranty, it necessarily follows, in the absence of fraud on the part
of the vendor, that the strict rule of caveat emptor must apply, in
which case the vendee is considered to have assumed the risk of the
durability of the crank-shaft and cannot recover the purchase price
from the vendor.
Wilson v. Lawrence, 139 Mass. 318, relied upon by the court,
was a case for breach of warranty in the sale of a piano, which was
ordered by the plaintiff, although he had not demanded one of any
particular class or quality, and the court held that in the absence of
any definite description of the instrument ordered the defendants
were bound only to furnish a piano which was merchantable and
salable and not one which should be free from future defects. This
case does not seem to bear as directly on the words used in the main
case as some others to be noticed. Indeed, one distinction between
the two cases is that the automobile was purchased, it seems, under
circumstances which gave the vendee the opportunity of personal
inspection, while the order in the other case was sent to the factory,
and no specific article was in the minds of both parties, so that the
representations of the salesman of the automobile were as to one
particular machine which. the vendee contemplated buying. This
would give the result that the representations of the salesman as to
the automobile could not possibly apply to any other machine, while
there existed more or less uncertainty as to the piano which was
the subject of sale in the other case. The general rule that goods
sold by sample must correspond accurately and exactly has been
strengthened by statutes in many states, and fraud is presumed by
setting up the receipt of goods different from those ordered by
sample.
To consider the effect of the words as used by the defendant,
Richardson v. Grandy, 49 Vt. 22, seems to be quite analogous to
the main case. There, a piece of machinery was sold by the defend-
ant to the plaintiff which was admittedly second-hand, but was to
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"be equal in all respects to a new one of the same kind,"and the court
held this to be a sufficient warranty for the plaintiff to maintain an
action upon. The court said: "While it is true that representations
descriptive of the thing sold, or which may be taken as expressive
of the opinion of the vendor, do not necessarily import a warranty,
yet, where representations are made by the vendor of the quality
of the thing sold, or its fitness for a particular purpose, if intended
as a part of the contract of sale, and the vendee makes the purchase,
relying upon such representations, they will in law constitute a con-
tract of warranty." It seems entirely reasonable to suppose that the
buyer of the automobile relied on the representations that it was all
right and in first-class condition, when it was expressly so stated,
even though it was a second-hand machine.
No doubt the authorities all agree upon the general rule that
mere words of praise or commendation, or which merely express
the vendor's belief, judgment, or opinion or estimate do not consti-
tute a warranty, Benj. on Sales, 7th Ed. p. 664; Long on Sales, 2nd
Am. Ed. p. 125, but there is a very strong line of authorities which
hold that a positive affirmation of a material fact, as fact, intended
to be relied on as such, and which is so relied upon, constitutes in
law a warranty, whether the vendor mentally intended to warrant it
or not and the intention is immaterial.
In Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Hardlan & Hollingsworth Co., 66
Md. 42, there was a contract to build a steamboat, the machinery of
which was "to be of the best material and the workmanship first-
class." Yellott, J., said in delivering the opinion of the court: "It
may not be denied that an express affirmation of quality intended to
operate on the mind of the vendee as an inducement to make a pur-
chase, and so operating constituted a warranty. The rule of law is
that any affirmation of the quality of the article, made at the time
of the sale, intended as an assurance of the fact stated and relied on
and acted on by the purchaser, will constitute an express warranty.
The Kentucky Court by Judge Holt has said: "A review of the
cases as to what constitutes a warranty, exhibits much learning and
diversity of opinion. Indeed, they cannot all be reconciled." Here
he cited an early case in which the rule was laid down that a mere
representation or affirmation, however positive, as to the character
or condition of an article, could not constitute a warranty and com-
mented upon this rule in these words: "It adhered to form rather
than reason, and the argument was of doubtful legal morality."
And again he said: "business and trade forbid much technicality.
Warranties enter largely into the trade of the country and it is
proper and best for its fairness and promotion that the language
used by those so engaged should in law receive its common accepta-
tion, and be construed as ordinarily understood by them. One man
is selling his horse to another and when particularly asked, he says,
'he is all right,' would not the purchaser understand this as embrac-
ing the question of soundness and would not the vendor be under-
stood as thereby saying to him in effect: 'he is sound?"' McClin-
tock v. Emick, Stoner & Co., 87 Ky. i6o.
Application of the dictum of Judge Holt to the case in question
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leads to the fact that the words "all right" and "in first-class conci-
tion" should be construed as an assertion which the maker should be
willing to answer for, provided such would be the usual business
meaning.
In an English case Lord Holt was quoted as correctly saying
that "an affirmation at the time of the sale is a warranty, provided
it appear on evidence to be so intended," Pasley v. Frecmalt, 3 T.
R. 57, and the Massachusetts court may have had evidence before
it which would show that the words were not intended to have bind-
ing effect, or the jury may have so determined, but the question
whether the buyer relied upon the statements is not discussed in the
opinion. The court may have felt that the circumstances showed
that the vendee could not have relied upon the salesman's word in
which case the court was following the strict rule frequently laid
down by English and American decisions.
However this may be, if the vendee had placed confidence and
reliance on the words "first-class condition" and "all right," the
decision means that "seller's talk" is favored by the courts and the
ordinary purchaser would be unsafe in attempting to rely on any-
thing short of a written guarantee or an unequivocal statement from
the vendor. We believe that the ordinary understanding of the
words used would mean that the seller intended to be answerable
and that any other construction would give him an undue advan-
tage over the purchaser.
